

CLUB OF THREE: SPECIAL SESSION ON DEFENCE

IF THIS IS A LONG WAR, ARE WE EQUIPPED TO WIN IT ?

Schloss Hugenpoet, Essen-Kettwig: 23/24 March 2007

REPORT

INTRODUCTION

The conference was opened by Dr. Olaf Berlien who welcomed the participants at Schloss Hugenpoet on behalf of this year's host, ThyssenKrupp. Michael Maclay represented the Weidenfeld Institute with its flagship initiative, the Club of Three. He passed on Lord Weidenfeld's best wishes who could not be present at this meeting. Introducing the opening session, Mr Maclay presented the idea of the 'long war' which was designed as the overarching theme of the three following sessions. Although contested the concept of a 'long war' against terrorism informed the discussions at several Club of Three Defence meetings since 2001. It had implications for the analysis of the threat, future defence procurement and the way politicians could get support from the public.

This year, many critical and rather pessimistic voices dominated the discussions. One speaker pointed out that since the last meeting in Les Mesnuls, many conflicts and related threats had intensified: Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Lebanon, failing states in Africa. At the same time, however, cooperation and understanding between the US and Europe had improved, particularly the close collaboration between the intelligence services.

SESSION I: How much has the threat changed?

Guiding questions:

- Hostile states: tough or tender with Iran and North Korea?
- Non-state actors: counter-terrorism and how to deal with Islamic terrorism?
- Collapsing states: are we adapting our force structures quickly enough to intervene effectively?

Rogue States were seen as one of the major threats to global security. Focussing on North Korea and Iran, participants expressed different views on the significance of the threat posed by both countries, in particular in the case of Iran. Concerns were expressed over Pakistan.

North Korea was seen as the single largest threat by one speaker. It was suggested that North Korea did not need its nuclear programme for deterrence purposes as American military action was unlikely for two reasons: first, the domestic political environment in the US made military action in another part of the world unlikely and secondly, the two neighbours China and South Korea feared a collapsing state and the subsequent wave of refugees. Instead, nuclear might have given the regime the required status for international negotiations and leverage to pursue national interests. Blackmail and brinkmanship were therefore a constant characteristic of Pyongyang's negotiation tactics.

Proliferation was seen as the most realistic threat caused by North Korea. There was no sign of reluctance to use illicit means to get hold of nuclear technology. Horizontal proliferation was likely to point towards Al Qaeda because of Pyongyang's neutral position. State failure would be a very problematic scenario, as it would leave a poor and disintegrated country with nuclear material in its bunkers. The six party talks established a framework for the management of North Korea which started as a dialogue on an ad hoc basis. The enhanced channels of communication between the US and China were regarded as a success. However, outcomes were not sufficient and long-term commitment by Pyongyang was deemed unlikely.

The possibility of a sudden crisis on a regional scale was acknowledged in the event of an internal power struggle or the total breakdown of the economy. In this case the six party talks offered an established framework for structured crisis management.

On Iran, participants expressed more diverse threat assessments. The pattern of blackmail and proliferation under the Ahmadinejad regime was similar to North Korea with a significant additional feature: the financing of terrorism. One participant commented that, unlike North Korea, Iran pursued its nuclear programme for deterrence reasons with regard to the still recent experience of war with Iraq and a perception of threat from surrounding Sunni countries and Western countries.

The question of how to deal with Iran was closely interlinked with the American engagement in Iraq. For the Bush administration the military option was not officially off the table, although the lack of domestic support would possibly lead to a presidential impeachment if that course was chosen, one speaker argued. A senior voice from the State Department expressed open support for a diplomatic solution during another WISD conference earlier in 2007. The North Korea model was highlighted as the preferred way to contain a potentially nuclear Iran: engage the administration in multilateral negotiations and integrate Iran back into the framework of the IAEA.

One intervention pointed to a possible lack of political strength and new policy ideas in the US administration. The gaps in American foreign policy in the Middle East were, however, tentatively filled by Saudi Arabia which had openly voiced its concerns. It was acknowledged that the prospect of an emerging crescent of Shiite states with Iraq and Lebanon led by Iran would lead to an understanding between Israel, the Saudis, Egypt and others who wanted to contain Iran.

Although India and Pakistan's nuclear programmes had been tolerated, a nuclear capable Iran was not conceivable because Israel would never accept a nuclear Iran. Neighbouring countries with sizable funds might then join a new nuclear weapons race, and this would affect the West's geo-strategic interests far more than the cases of India and Pakistan.

Some suggested that Pakistan could also be seen as a rogue state. Although an ally in the global fight against terrorism including counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan, Islamabad had exploited its

position. Its role in the surge of global proliferation of nuclear technology still had not been sufficiently addressed. At the same time, domestic failures to constrain terrorist activities supporting fighters in Afghanistan and training Jihadists had had severe consequences for the fight on terror.

Failed states

Failing and failed states were posing a different kind of threat to global security. Terrorist activities in so-called black holes, mentioned by one participant, caused increasing concern in the international community. Failed states like the Congo, Uganda and Sierra Leone had continued to endanger stability in their region. The instability in Iraq and Afghanistan had implications of a global scale as international Islamist terror forces found psychological breeding grounds for extremist ideas and for the training of terrorists in these countries. Iraq had now become a safe haven for international terrorism and the world's only place where Al Qaeda was in direct combat with American troops. Another example was Somalia, which became a playground for terror groups.

Afghanistan remained a top priority on the Western security agenda as, even after years of combat with the Taliban, the country could not be stabilised. It was pointed out that there was no linear progression from high-intensity combat to stabilisation and reconstruction. Security conditions remained poor. Instead of being able to offer alternative livelihoods to growing poppies, fighting with the Taliban had intensified.

One of the dilemmas was that the alliance had failed to ensure domestic support for the new government. While the output in terms of security and economic well-being had been poor in the last years, the Taliban could act as pure resistance movement without being held accountable for the suffering of Afghan people. In the view of some of the participants, certain Western institutions could not be imported like for like. Adjustments had to be made for example in the field of civil law with regard to local tradition and Sharia law. Therefore it was vital to involve local experience and to seek early local support for reforms and government.

The situation in Iraq and Afghanistan had proved that foreign intervention had to encompass military action and long-term state building, which included sustainable forces to ensure security, the reconstruction of infrastructure and houses and the use of legitimate political power and civil society. It was argued that clearer central planning was needed to ensure the success of overlapping military and civil operations during an intervention in order to ensure long-term success.

In terms of military capacities, intervention units had still to be better trained and equipped in order to adapt to the daily challenges troops face in conflict areas. Furthermore, international efforts had to focus on upstream assistance before states collapse. In this regard, lessons from Bosnia were still not put into action, one speaker emphasised.

In Afghanistan, the possibility of a strategic failure had strong implications for the future of NATO and the assessment of its capabilities on the one hand and long-term success of Western policies with regard to foreign intervention and democratisation on the other. It was pointed out that international efforts of state building and democratisation had to seek a broader alliance of democracies around the world including, for example, India. Recent lessons from the US and NATO-led attempts had been seen by some as the imposition of the liberal order and a manifestation of Western dominance.

Terrorism

Critical views also prevailed in the discussion on the fight against international and home-grown Islamist terrorism. Some pointed out that the West had never faced such a wide terrorist movement, even before 9/11.

Internationally, Al Qaeda had reorganised and had, along with other terrorist networks, benefited from better recruitment of new Jihadists. In the UK, protection from a terrorist attack had improved but the threat was unconventional and therefore difficult to predict. One of the characteristics of terrorism was that terrorists only needed to be successful once, whilst prevention had to succeed every single time. Public transport was seen as the most likely target of further attacks, since it was impossible to impose the same security measures on tubes, trains and buses as in airports.

Intelligence about how the networks organise themselves and recruit was difficult to gather because Al Qaeda, for example, was an entity with different cores and cells with hardly any communication between them. Efforts had to focus on how Jihadist ideas spread. The role of the family and the role of mothers in particular was emphasised by one participant. It had to be monitored to understand the 'mental mechanism' that turns young men into Islamist terrorists.

It was important to address the causes of Islamist extremism and terrorism. Some participants stressed that it was an ideological challenge rather than a long war. Many agreed that it was a long-term campaign to divide the terrorists and the population from which new recruits were drawn, especially with regard to the large young Muslim population. It was acknowledged that Western foreign policies in the Middle East and towards Muslim countries had some bearing on radicalisation at home and abroad.

In Europe, it was an indigenous problem that had to be acknowledged and addressed by domestic policies. Different ways of dealing with home-grown terrorism could be found in France, Germany and Britain. The question of how to stop Islamists taking advantage of liberal Western societies had to be approached in appropriate ways for different national circumstances. To fight radicalisation in its early stage among the diverse Muslim population in Europe, the different narratives within communities that led to extremist views and violence had to be identified and countered.

The discussions pointed to the vulnerabilities of the West with its reliance on global supply chains and its liberal, open societies. The issue of energy security highlighted Europe and America's dependency on production, transport and timely delivery of fossil fuels. Therefore, energy remained an Achilles heel within Western foreign policy and security – vulnerable to blackmail, local conflicts and terrorism. While threats of conventional warfare could be predicted, national security strategies were still not sufficiently acknowledging new kinds of asymmetric threats, as one participant stressed. So-called 'structured terrorism' aimed to paralyse a country with a sustained shock by cutting off or interrupting flows of natural resources, knowledge or finance. Similar discussions on how to block a country's defence capabilities had arisen in Chinese security circles.

Many agreed that a broader concept of threat was needed to address today's challenges for policy makers. Other issues like mass migration from failing states and public health in an age of global travel would require new international policy approaches.

SESSION II: Procurement and technology in face of the new threats and in the context of globalisation

Guiding questions:

- Procurement: are we procuring too many of the wrong platforms? Should we be procuring more at European level?
- Technology: do governments understand it? Are we exploiting it sufficiently?
- Finance: Will government pockets be deep enough to preserve European defence companies? Do Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) represent the most balanced model for the future?
- US industry as collaborator or competitor: Is transatlantic co-operation the only answer?

Concerning the improvement of defence capabilities, some participants concluded in the previous session that forces needed further adaptation to ensure a short reaction time, in particular in Navies and air transport. In times when the concept of defence expanded to include possible (pre-emptive) foreign intervention as well as long-lasting peacekeeping operations, mobility and swiftness had to be ensured. In the long-term restructuring of weaponry since the end of the Cold war, a balance between classic deterrence weapons and a new generation of anti-ballistic systems had to be found.

Procurement

It was emphasised that, in times when international joint military responses were required, defence planning within NATO and the EU still lacked international coordination. Allies were not able to agree on common priorities in procurement, which had had repercussions for the development of new technologies and the shape of European defence companies. The burden of defence spending was unevenly shared among allies. For example only 6 of 26 NATO members were spending more than 2 percent of their GDP for defence purposes.

It was suggested that a sustainable industrial and technology collaboration could only be achieved by, firstly, developing a common vision of threats and strategies on how to counter them and, subsequently, developing procurement procedures as a prerequisite of efficient spending.

Current procurement in the UK and the US had been starkly affected by the fact that both countries were currently at war. Urgent operational requirements in the UK had cost an additional 2 billion pounds in 2006, mostly for combat operations. Although mechanisms were in place, regular acquisition programmes would come under constrain in the long run as all operations were handled with the same amount of staff.

The optimisation of the procurement process was decisive to ensure success in current long-term operations like Afghanistan as well as any potential other fast response operations in the future. Procurement processes still had little flexibility. Budgets were often bound to earlier commitments - sometimes systems that were not adequate in the face of new threats.

Lessons learned from recent urgent procurement included: Firstly, better acquisition of weaponry for small and agile forces preferring flexible systems to be used in different kinds of conflicts; secondly, improving relationships with the industry through a combination of hard-nosed partnering and the

use of incentives; and thirdly, facilitating greater transparency in planning. With regard to constrained budgets, a particular dilemma lay in the need to secure short-term success in ongoing operations whilst securing long-term investment for possible future challenges.

Another contribution stressed that slow cycles of procurement might make longer 'breaks' from combat necessary for parts of forces in order to regain full functionality. But the cause was also to be found in shortcomings of the defence industry. The delayed delivery of major defence platforms led to the necessity of redefining yesterday's equipment for today's challenges. Examples could be found in the area of air force, marine and land force systems.

The role of the industry had to change from that of a contractor, which delivered full solutions for fixed requirements, to a partner in a proper dialogue, which made flexible basic systems and variants of specialisations quickly available on a continuous basis. Defence companies would have to be involved earlier in the procurement process.

On a European level, shared requirements, shared outlook and a shared way of operating were to be identified. The response should not again lead to government-inspired 'grand projects' which tie up resources and therefore limit flexibility in the long-term. Recent industry-originated projects in areas such as helicopters and communications were promising.

Technology

Recent challenges for defence forces, as outlined in the previous session, might require only low-tech adjustments of weaponry. Technological advance however was seen by participants as one of the key factors in the long-term success of homeland security and military operations abroad. Some stressed the demanding combat situations in certain conflict areas and the fast technological progress of the opponents who had advanced, for example, in the field of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) very quickly. Counter-IED was not a low-tech operation. The highest standards of weaponry were crucial for the success of many of these operations.

The importance of technology was not fully understood by European governments. The US remained the touchstone in R&D spending as well as generating and implementing new technology. Although the ratio of R&D spending in Europe was 10 percent lower than in the US, budgets grew by less than 1.5 percent while growth in the US reached 9 percent in the last 5 years.

Novel ideas lost traction in Europe because defence spenders had failed to take opportunities to pull in new technologies in the development of products. It was emphasised that an institution like the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was missing in European countries. The industry in Europe relied too much on government funding.

It was mentioned that the lack of understanding at a government level led in some cases to autarkic handling of funds by specialised bureaucrats who often did not fully grasp the value of money spent and time used when commissioning new research projects. Vital opportunities for competitive technological advance were therefore missed due to the lack of awareness on all levels.

A new feature of the globalised economy was that a fast growing high-tech industry made an increasing number of defence-relevant technologies available worldwide, including in sectors like biotechnology and communication. This was seen as another area of vulnerability.

Future of the European defence sector

Upcoming reviews of national defence spending in France and the UK, due to anticipated changes in governments, highlighted the strong dependency of the defence industry on political decisions. However, no easy savings by cutting budgets could be made, as one speaker stressed, since cuts in the budget implied abandoning capabilities which could not easily be replaced when needed. This had triggered a loss of critical mass among European defence companies. It had to be acknowledged that ultimately defence companies were part of defence capabilities.

Policies had been enacted and intentions had been declared to address the problems faced by the industry which had to share a cake in Europe half the size of the US market, but with 3 to 4 times more contractors. Lip service was paid by governments to the harmonisation of the European defence market and commitment was given for spending, but policies had not been put into action either with in the sense of European defence cooperation or in national procurement policies.

As for the Defence Technology Industry Base (DTIB), one participant noted good developments including its recognition at national and European level and the development of a defence industrial strategy in the UK and France. Bad news was that some policies moved backwards even though DTIB was headed in the right direction. In terms of company ownership, some countries overstepped the line and moved beyond simply ensuring regulation and control of vital security assets, when seeking to protect jobs, to define the company's strategy and to appoint the management. It was remarked that a golden share was enough to prevent a hostile takeover or to prevent the management from divesting in vital security assets.

The chances that the funds of approximately 200 billion euros currently spent in Europe for defence would significantly be increased were seen as very slim. A factor that weakened the argument for increasing defence budgets was the inefficiency caused by national procurement policies which had protected domestic companies by buying their products rather than competitive alternatives. This kind of industry preservation had led to unnecessary duplication of research and production with serious repercussions for defence budgets and the forces supplied with the less competitive product.

Another participant pointed out that as long as more than half of the defence budgets in European countries were spent on personnel, increases in R&D spending and procurement, which only takes up an average of 18 percent, were not likely. Both cases presented, however, an opportunity to reallocate funds for efficient investment in innovation and healthier industries.

Transformation of European defence companies towards full competitiveness was crucial. It was suggested that US firms should be included in the European market and to strengthen the market share of SMEs. Both measures would help to avoid inefficient and non-transparent cartel structures.

Hope was expressed that the existing Memorandum of Understanding on enhanced competition in Research and Technology would be fully implemented by all countries.

PPPs (Public Private Partnerships) were not fully embraced both by industry figures and procurement experts. A pragmatic approach was recommended. With regard to the criticism of state intervention and market distortion, it was suggested that PPPs might not be the model for a solution as they only had a limited effect.

In the case of the UK, the security spending for the upcoming 2012 Olympic Games could generate spin offs worth up to 5 billion euros as it did in Athens. Advances in surveillance technology could, for example, be used for homeland security and foreign military operations.

The US and Europe

The US industry was seen in many aspects as a touchstone and competitor to Europe's industry. From a broader perspective, the US was regarded as an ally, friend and role model for the European defence community. The idea of a transatlantic free trade zone championed by Chancellor Merkel was embraced, not least for its long-term implications for transatlantic trade and competition in the field of defence. The US market offered an alternative to the constrained European budgets, but also held costs and risks for foreign companies.

Good news was that European companies like EADS and Thales were making good sales in the American market in some cases, such as helicopters. European industry was therefore able to provide superior platforms in competition to American products, but they had to play by the rules which required production facilities in the US, for example. Recent experiences had shown that Americans were interested in healthy and competitive companies which in turn could expect 10 percent return on sales. However, this positive relationship came at the costs of dealing with bureaucracy and the need to invest in extensive lobbying.

One participant expressed concerns about the long-term balance between American and European forces with regard to future joint combat operations under NATO. The US lacked the political will to consider sharing technology facilitating the interoperability of the alliance, which was critical for joint interventions. NATO itself was, since George Robertson's departure, no longer the forum of such coordination. Europe's politicians on the other hand seemed unwilling to push their partner towards closer cooperation. Political cooperation therefore remained poor in this regard, while industrial relations had intensified.

The cost of providing healthcare for soldiers suffering from injuries and post-traumatic stress disorders also had to be taken into account. This would put constraints on future budgets.

SESSION III: Politics, diplomacy and public opinion

Guiding questions:

- How can electorates be persuaded to pay the price of defence?
- Should defence be repackaged as homeland security?
- Which alliances: Is NATO any more effective – or more saleable - than the EU or the UN as instrument of international cooperation?

Public opinion and support for European and national defence

Public opinion emerged as one of the key topics to be addressed when looking into the question of how governments could adjust defence and security policies to today's threats. One speaker emphasised that certain key topics had had a deep and lasting impact on what the public thinks. The current debate about the American missile defence systems to be deployed in Eastern Europe had seen only a half-hearted response from Germany in the face of rather threatening Russian comments. This was not well received in Eastern European neighbouring countries that expected a clear solidarity in the 'clubs', i.e. NATO and EU, which they had just joined.

A lack of solidarity was also felt within Western Europe concerning the alliance's operations in Afghanistan where British and Dutch troops were fighting on the frontline, while others had kept their heads low in the country's calmer provinces. This confirmed increasingly sceptic views of NATO in the British public for example, making it harder to justify additional contributions in terms of equipment and troops. Furthermore, as a political leader put it earlier in the conference, there was no victory to present to the public, making it hard in each country to generate further support.

Ignorance or divergent perceptions made it difficult to communicate the needs and costs of defence on the one hand and to raise the awareness of the threats Western societies face today on the other. Many participants shared the view that there was a dangerous ignorance in the European public sphere towards the real impact of terrorism, failing states, rogue regimes and their linkages.

This unawareness could be attributed to geographic location. Eastern Europeans for example were more concerned about an assertive Russia and possible instability in Ukraine than the Germans, while the British cared more about terrorism than the Finns. However, it was argued that many in the West still lived a post-modern world not realising the new vulnerabilities resulting from globalisation and not understanding the new fault lines of world politics and their resulting threats.

Some highlighted the lack of political leadership: politicians did not want to tell the full truth about the necessity of more defence expenditure and engagement in foreign interventions. Part of the problem was incompetence and ignorance among political elites who did often not understand today's threats themselves. There was often no political courage to openly address difficult issues like nuclear deterrence capabilities or decisions on foreign deployment.

It was easy to criticise the use of force and call for peaceful solutions. If this platitude was too often abused by politicians, the public would not be ready to take action against a nuclear Iran for instance, even if that action consisted of procurement of missile defence systems, for example. One participant emphasised on the issue of terrorism that the 'fabric of society' was at stake. With an unaware and unprepared public, it was easier for terrorists to cause significant damage to that fabric.

Other remarks pointed out that the public had a different sense of threat and had difficulties in understanding why sending troops abroad would help to increase domestic security. There was a growing concern about the implications of Western interventions in Muslim countries for home-grown Islamist terrorism. Taking today's influence of in-depth international media coverage from all conflict areas into account, it was important to acknowledge the impact of Western actions on public opinion at home and abroad. Europe and the US had to close the gap between stated intentions and actions and rebuild moral legitimacy of interventions, including looking closely at the behaviour of their troops in interactions with other cultures.

Repackaging defence & new security concepts

The question of how military operations abroad helped to solve domestic problems was also important to justify defence spending. Many discussants emphasised that it was up to political leaders to ensure public understanding of the link between the domestic threat and operations abroad. Others pointed out that the media also had to take responsibility in bringing across how success in Iraq and Afghanistan was vital to the security situation at home.

The role of the international press and broadcasting was rather questionable in this regard. There was a contradiction between the expansion of on-the-spot coverage from conflict zones around the world and the cutback of skilled journalistic personnel. One participant suggested setting up

scholarship schemes for journalists to deepen their knowledge of defence, related technology and the work of the forces on the ground.

Although many saw a lot of potential for synergies between homeland security and defence including the sharing of technology, it was mostly not recommended to simply repackage defence as it would be misleading. Trust had to be restored by political leadership and clarity on the relationship between them might help to generate support.

One intervention emphasised the need for the development of a security concept to systematically integrate defence policies and homeland security, which itself was an approach developed after 9/11. A thorough assessment followed by the definition of goals and the development of policies could foster understanding and support in the government and the public. This would lead to more flexibility between both budgets.

Some explored the idea of additional paramilitary forces for domestic protection. While France had its Gendarmerie, the UK and Germany were still lacking integrated units that anchored defence in the protection of national territory. Furthermore, compatibility in the long-term between different countries for an enhanced European cooperation would add value. The current security gap in countries, like the UK, had to be taken into consideration where the positioning and training of armed forces did not reflect the need to protect vital infrastructure.

Many agreed that defence budgets were most likely not to rise and that other approaches for efficiency in spending had to be achieved. Apart from the joint use of funding for new technology with domestic and military purposes, a specialisation among European countries was suggested. Division of labour was desirable for Europe's production. In smaller countries this was already becoming a reality as they had begun to scale down air forces, for example.

There was only partial hope of increasing public knowledge of defence issues. It was important to seek emotional support for the troops and their operations in order to generate support for the procurement of the best technology for soldiers in combat. Simple and clear messages were therefore more useful than technical and strategic details.

Preferred alliances: NATO, UN and EU

As one speaker remarked, the United Nations were seen by many as a world government, but in fact it was not able to formulate decisive actions. In this regard, NATO was far more capable, but its decisions were difficult to sell to the public as it was seen as having less legitimacy. The US and NATO, however, were still the lenders of last resort in military terms, since only the American military had the capability to swiftly send its forces everywhere in the world and to be able to fight several conflicts at the same time.

It was mentioned that the EU was a remarkable soft power institution, but with little joint defence capacity. Although European Battle Groups were seen as a good political gesture pointing in the right direction, the lack of solidarity among member states was regarded as a fundamental problem. Mutual specialisation of national forces, sustainable burden sharing and availability in a state of emergency were therefore seen as problematic. The question of who could rely on whom still had not been answered satisfactorily in terms of spending, manpower and equipment.

It was noted that the Nordic battle group was an exception due to the commitment of Sweden. In general, EU joint military capabilities had seen a remarkable enhancement over the last decade. But trust in those capabilities and the visibility of these joint forces were key for further military, political

and public support – especially in big spending countries like France and the UK. One participant warned against a downward spiral undermining not only specific operations but the European defence alliance.

Some stated that European capabilities so far were useful for peacekeeping missions. The European intervention strategy had established a mix of military and civil elements, sending not only troops but also policemen, judges, teachers etc. This holistic state building approach, including trade policies for example, was seen as promising in post-conflict areas, although not those with higher security needs like Iraq and Afghanistan.

As for NATO, Europe had to get its act together in order to contribute to its share of the alliance on the one hand, and the US had to be ready again for an open dialogue on the other. Most participants agreed that enhanced EU defence capabilities could be seen as complementary to NATO rather than as an alternative. It was argued that EU forces were to be a body within and outside of NATO. Furthermore, a pragmatic approach was important to find the right tool – UN, EU, NATO and other ad hoc alliances – to resolve today's crises. Ideology and suspicion had to be overcome on both sides of the Atlantic. Solutions like the so-called 'Berlin Plus' plan pointed in the right direction: utilising European capabilities under NATO command in the campaign against terrorism.