

# AMEURUS

## AMERICAN EUROPEAN AND RUSSIAN COOPERATION

### REBUILDING THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

**Conference arranged by Bertelsmann Foundation and the Club of Three,  
held at Schlosshotel Kronberg on October 6/7, 2003**

Disarray within the international community in the wake of military intervention in Iraq is both a cause for concern but also an opportunity to restore and reshape international instruments of cooperation. Much of the discussion focussed on the prospects for closer trilateral political and economic coordination between the AMEURUS Troika: America, Europe and Russia. It was imperative for this leading group of world powers to arrive at a common perception of the threat posed by terrorism and by weapons of mass destruction and to search for consensus on conflict management.

There was no attempt to skirt over the difficulties of achieving agreement on matters such as the conditions under which preemptive military intervention is justified or how to deal with failed states. There was concern that disagreements over Iraq as well as US-European tensions over the EU's goal of setting up its own defence arm would undermine or at least delay trilateral co-operation on security matters. It was also stressed that China must not be excluded from cooperative efforts. Many of the exchanges reflected concern over differences in political and economic culture which often create obstacles to closer cooperation between Americans, Russians and the Europeans. But on the whole, the conference felt the members of the AMEURUS Troika needed each other too much to be deterred from seeking ways of working more closely together.

Though many speakers referred to the AMEURUS constellation as a triangle, it was recognised that power was unevenly distributed and that policies frequently diverged. Even if Troika members had a common perception of threat – which they do not yet have – much work also needs to be done to determine circumstances when military intervention deserved to be preferred over diplomatic pressure. It followed that the three components of AMEURUS remained far from achieving a perfect fit. The

attraction of AMEURUS derives from the opportunities which these informal exchanges provide to identify and analyse neuralgic issues, paving the way towards the creation of a more even-sided triangle.

At Kronberg all were agreed that even though US primacy in military power is undisputed, debate continues both within the Administration and among America's allies over the use of that power in the management of its foreign policies. On all sides the view was expressed that it would be against the common interest for the US to be forced out of Iraq; but most speakers also felt that reconstruction in Iraq was too important to be left to the US/UK coalition and that the Bush Administration must be persuaded to share power and responsibility with the EU and with Russia.

While there was much discussion about Iraq, Iran was another major preoccupation. There was broad agreement that the problems posed by Iran's development of nuclear weapons demanded urgent answers which could best be sought in a trilateral context.

It was acknowledged that Europe's preoccupation with enlargement issues and with the terms of its constitution overshadowed its goal of achieving a common security and foreign policy. But in any event, EU members remained divided over cooperation with the US on issues such as Iraq and the future of NATO and its relationship to the European defence force now under negotiation.

Russian speakers stressed that President Putin's priorities were for the time being on domestic issues with special emphasis on its economic development, but also on the political and security challenges posed by the far-flung Russian Federation. Even if foreign policy had to take second place, Russia nevertheless wanted to be an active player. Russia would be guided by a cardinal principle: a determination to avoid having to make choices between support for Europe or for the US.

During the final session, AMEURUS was praised as an informal process which has demonstrated that much is to be learned from such informal discussions between Americans, Europeans and Russians. AMEURUS meetings have triggered frank speech and have identified areas of tension— sometimes well before they surfaced in other arenas. It was recommended that the attention of governments should be drawn

to the work done by AMEURUS and that a Manifesto or Declaration should be drawn up to agree on certain fundamental principles to emerge from the project. Participants agreed that they gain insights and take away important lessons from these informal AMEURUS meetings.

## **SESSION I A Trilateral Strategy for the Security Framework**

The issues addressed included US leadership; transatlantic ties as a factor for unity or for division, Russia's posture as a world power standing between Europe and the US; and the Middle East as a theatre both for cooperation but also for competition.

Introductory remarks by speakers from each side of the Troika produced some common ground, but also considerable differences of emphasis. A European defence expert set out reasons why America, Europe and Russia at present have a unique opportunity to forge a common security policy: the US remains committed to remain in Europe; Russia recognises that success for its transformation depends, at least in part, on European and US support; and the EU wants to be taken seriously as a player on the international stage. In a best-case scenario, the Troika could build on this coincidence of interest to arrive at a common threat assessment and by building on NATO or its successor security organisation, create an institutional framework for security cooperation. Most participants felt that attempts by the US to build security cooperation on the *a la carte* basis favoured in some quarters of Washington should be resisted. One European speaker fleshed this out with an agenda that would include regular meetings on 'homeland' security, intensified intelligence cooperation, discussions towards a common definition of what constitutes 'failed states' and how to deal them, and a search for consensus on human rights safeguards in the context of security consideration and military intervention. Further, there should be closer cooperation on the destruction of nuclear waste and obsolete nuclear weapons. Armed forces should be trained with far greater emphasis on peacekeeping. As a footnote to this agenda, the speaker stressed that it would be wiser in public relations terms to describe the campaign to contain terrorism not as a war but as a struggle.

Russia attached great importance to institutional security links with both Europe and the US, Russian speakers stressed during this session. But they warned that the

Russian commitment was still very wobbly with the old familiar truths abandoned and the new truths still under elaboration. Russia needs a period of tranquillity and feels particularly vulnerable with respect to its territorial integrity. In this context the Russia speakers cited poverty and deprivation in Siberia as a time bomb that deserved more attention from the outside world as well as from Moscow. Greater cooperation between the permanent members of the UN Security Council would be a useful step towards closer security arrangements.

In subsequent discussion there was disagreement whether the AMEURUS Troika should promote institutional reform at the UN. While some were in favour others thought reform is impossible to achieve in the short run and would be a costly distraction from far more urgent matters.

The coming year could be decisive in determining whether America, Europe and Russia can forge a common approach to security challenges, as one of the US speakers put it. In an election year, President Bush would have to decide whether to risk unpopularity at home – possibly leading to the election of a Democrat - by maintaining the Administration's unilateralist approach in its dealings with the outside world. In any event next year will pose a crucial test of progress towards constitutional democracy in Iraq.

In the European Union, the outcome of the present inter-governmental conference will determine whether there is sufficient common political will to achieve a common security policy. The scheduled NATO summit in Istanbul next May is expected to redefine the organisation's overall mission – and its relationship to any defence arrangements made by the EU. 2004 will also show whether the Dohar round of trade negotiations can be revived. Finally, it will be crunch-time for testing whether the United Nations can be re-energised.

The momentum building up for 2004 should provide opportunities for long-range collaboration between the AMEURUS Troika countries, the speaker urged. They should focus on the search for consensus on handling threats from weapons of mass destruction; they should build up trust between NATO and Russia and, last but not least, they should build bridges to the Muslim world.

Elaborating on some of the ideas put forward by previous speakers, a European participant criticised the United States for its negative attitude to the EU proposals for a European Defence Planning staff. Washington was wrong to assert that such moves would undermine NATO. However, the same speaker also argued that the EU was not being creative enough in discussing common security concerns with the US. The European defence issue became a recurring theme during this session – with Americans warning the EU against going too far to establish an independent defence pillar and Europeans arguing that the EU should be more robust in building structured defence cooperation. The Russians steered clear of addressing this issue and could not be drawn into discussing closer Russian links with NATO.

In aiming for a common security framework for the AMEURUS Troika, its architects must bear in mind that a US military commitment is indispensable, another speaker argued. But as security threats from terrorism and failed states have little in common with the military threats of the cold war period, more than one participant asserted that the principle of non-intervention against sovereign states, which has guided international relations since 1945, must be redefined. (Legal aspects of this were discussed in Session IV). For several participants, all this reinforces the case for institutionalised dialogue between the US, the EU and Russia, including regular informal meetings between Foreign Ministers. While such trilateral arrangements are desirable, China must not be neglected.

Further words of caution came from speakers who argued that a common threat assessment would be difficult to achieve for the Troika. AMEURUS countries are guided by different philosophies in response to threats. Moreover, they have different priorities – especially different regional interests – and it is unlikely that the Troika countries can agree to commit themselves to common action in defence of particular interests. Siberia is one example where Russian security priorities are unlikely to be shared by US and the EU/Russian focus on defence of the territorial integrity of its Far Eastern lands, especially Siberia, is one area where a joint strategy cannot easily be secured. One way of addressing the problem of different priorities might be a division of labour with Russia left to look after Central Asia and its Far East frontiers, while the US and Europe focusses on the Middle East and related areas of tension. However, the same Russian speaker worried that his country's military power had

become so reduced that it might be unable to deal with major crisis on its own; yet neither the EU nor America might be willing to help.

There was a strong case for pragmatism, countered one participant, pointing to cooperation in Kosovo where the US, Russia and the Europeans have been able to work together. Triangular cooperation on security matters should, at least for now, be sought on a case by case basis.

Other speakers saw only difficulties ahead. One pointed to different perceptions of the use of the military in response to threats, with the US far more willing to act than the Europeans who prefer the use of soft power and diplomacy. Another asserted that the imbalance in the triangle is simply too great to offer a tangible prospect for cooperation on security. Disagreements over Iraq overshadowed all efforts at closer cooperation. The European Union lacks teeth – there is nothing in EU treaties or in the draft EU constitution to match article V in the NATO Treaty under which member states are committed to collective action in defence of any one of their members. EU efforts towards a common defence force were dismissed as laughable. As for the NATO treaty itself, it must at the very least be amended to meet the challenges of the post Cold War period. However, the US had so far given little lead or impetus to renegotiation. In sum: the US is unwilling to lead; the Europeans are in disarray over defence, and Russia is on the defensive over Chechnya. The conditions for trilateral management of security concerns are lacking.

Another pessimist recalled the assessment made at the first AMEURUS conference in Washington last February on the eve of the Iraq war that the world was witnessing the destruction of the international system. Six months later, the underlying situation was not far different. Stability is not on offer. Bilateralism and *a la carte* diplomacy predominate. Russia remains hesitant about being an active participant in the management of the international community. Unless the EU succeeds in rallying around common foreign and security policies, it is almost pointless to hope for a triangular approach to security challenges. Iraq and Iran are the test case for such ambitions.

If the US-led coalition fails in Iraq, then everybody loses, agreed a US participant. It would be a great mistake for EU countries or Russia to distance themselves from reconstruction in Iraq. It would further diminish US interest in international commitments. It would never be easy to enlist the US in triangular cooperation in security affairs. It would become all the harder, the speaker warned, if the EU persists in establishing its own defence structure independent from NATO.

## **Session II: A trilateral approach in Economic Relations**

The issue of trilateral cooperation in the economic sphere was discussed against the background of issues such as the strength and influence of the US economy; Russia's dependence on oil and natural gas; slow economic growth in the EU; and the difficulties of finding common ground in running the world trade system.

Participants were divided between those who felt that preoccupation with the domestic economy precluded closer triangular cooperation, and those who felt that economic integration has already advanced to a point where it has become easier for the AMEURUS Troika to work together on economic issues than on strategic problems. But irrespective of whether the strong case could be made for trilateralism in economic affairs, there was general agreement that the key to improvement of the Russian economy lies in its relations with both the EU and the US.

Those who opted for the first scenario argued that the US is struggling with its deficit, that the EU is in difficulty over its stability pact and that Russia is hamstrung by its over-dependence on energy resources and preoccupied by the problems of modernisation. None of this has created the condition for a trilateral approach to the broad economic challenges posed by the Third world, by trade with China, by WTO or the revival of the Doha negotiations.

If the ground is to be prepared for closer cooperation between the Troika, then it is essential to understand what is happening in China, where capital development is at present largely self-financed. This distances China's economy from America, Europe and to a growing extent Russia, who are all committed to opening up capital movements across borders. The US is currently the biggest investor in Europe;

similarly, there has been a heavy influx of foreign capital into the US. In Russia foreign investment has already reached sizeable proportions – an estimated \$21 billion with more finance coming in all the time. However if China appears to deliver less return on its external investment, it is also a hugely important market for consumer goods, and it is on the back of this phenomenon that the Troika might see openings for a common strategy. More specific areas for a trilateral approach to economic relations would be for the Europeans to use their strengths in financial services and technology, for Russia to define its long- term oil policies and for the US to shed its protectionist image.

But the session also heard a far more positive version of the prospects for triangular cooperation in the economic sphere. A European speaker based his arguments on three propositions: First: that a *de facto* trilateralism in economic relations already exists. After all America and Europe including Russia already have greater stakes in each others' economies than they had at any earlier time in history.

Second: that the business community already straddles frontiers and can transform the trilateral approach into a more stable triangular structure. The power of economic interdependence has become a major factor in the ties that bind America, Europe and Russia; they perform a bridge-building function even when there are diplomatic tensions over Iraq or Kyoto or even when trade disputes flare up.

Third: that America, Europe and Russia have an opportunity to create an unparalleled degree of economic integration; but must realise that interdependence does not mean there will be an absence of conflict.

Fleshing out these propositions, the speaker argued that probably the most meaningful aspect of globalisation is the investment flow between the United States and Europe, which is greater than between any other two continents. For example, during the 1990's US investment in Britain alone was almost 50 per cent higher than in the whole of the Asia-Pacific region. Altogether roughly half the global total of US foreign direct investment has been directed to Europe, and if Russia is included in these figures, it accounts for half of total global earnings of US companies. In turn the US is the most important market in terms of the earnings of European multinationals.



US firms in Europe employ over 4 million people, while 7 million people in the US owe their jobs to European investors.

Arguably even during the Cold War business interests had already become a stabilising influence on the West's relations with Russia. But in recent times trade and investment between the EU and Russia has acquired a genuine momentum towards economic interdependence. Russia has become a key supplier of energy for Europe; and the energy partnership with the US is also growing. Both British and US companies are investing heavily in the Russian energy sector. But even in other industrial sectors, Russia still has an edge over China for foreign investors. Russia is more advanced technically. The speaker was emphatic that Russia is following a path of economic integration with Europe and the US. President Putin no longer sees any conflict in building economic links with both the US and with the EU. He sees them as equally important trade partners and is prepared to discuss and negotiate in a trilateral context.

A Russian participant agreed with much of this analysis but emphasised that the Russian economy must still be regarded as the weakest side of the triangle. Russia still has much to learn about the market economy. Among its weaknesses is distrust of foreigners and even of foreign investment, insufficient understanding of the importance of research and development and inadequate experience of the rules of good governance. Russians still tend to regard foreign capital as an unconditional gift which should leave them free to do with it as they see fit. They resent the oligarchs and have failed to see that these men, reformed former robber barons, have introduced efficiency and good business practise and are able to work in partnership with foreign investors. Russia needs foreign investment if for no other reason than that it brings new technology, know-how and helps to improve managerial standards. It is especially important to attract investment to Siberia.

But this Russian speaker also emphasised that Russia must not focus on its trade and investment relations with Europe and America at the expense of China. It is particularly important to maintain oil exports to China. Another participant, however, cautioned Russia against directing investment funds to China; Europe is far more fertile ground for Russian investors.

### **Session III: Clash of civilisation in trilateral relations?**

This agenda item opened the way to a variety of remarks about the AMEURUS Troika and its posture with respect to the outside world. The first speaker was a Russian participant who listed the belt of unstable countries from Vancouver to Vladivostock and questioned whether the Troika is able and willing either individually or collectively to work together to meet these challenges and devise common strategies.

The situation in the Middle East is volatile and dangerous. If the US leaves Iraq, civil war is inevitable. Therefore, the US must stay; but can Russia and Europe help to stabilise the situation? In Israel, Syria and Afghanistan the Troika countries have a weak hand. And with respect to totalitarian states like Uzbekistan, Pakistan and North Korea, their hand is even weaker.

This participant said that Russia has yet to show on whose side it is, and asserted that President Putin has so far failed to prove his democratic credentials. In Russia, he said, if we are optimists, we say we shall be paralysed later. But if we are pessimists, we are already paralysed now. However, he also blamed the Europeans for creating transatlantic tensions, which made it harder for Russia to develop an even-handed foreign policy. He painted an unflattering picture of the US, which is with all its military and economic power nevertheless impotent in the face of the complexities of the 21st century. He illustrated his frustration with the Americans: The hunter has all possible armaments. But he is helpless against an attack from swarms of mosquitoes. President Bush might say: "we'll destroy the nest." But he forgets that mosquitoes have no nests. They live in swamps, and the US can only eradicate them in cooperation with other countries. He was pessimistic that triangular AMEURUS cooperation can become close enough to join in eliminating the threats emanating from the danger zone swamps straddling Russia, America and Europe.

On the contrary, argued another participant, the problems of Central Asia and the Middle East have real potential for trilateral cooperation towards reducing tensions. On a broad front, the Three could act to contain Islamic extremism. He also advocated

that the Three should jointly address the Kashmir problem which poses acute dangers for their geopolitical interests, and Afghanistan which requires underpinning even though it is unlikely to achieve complete stability. The location of oil pipelines from Central Asia is another global issue which the Troika should address. The effort to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear power can also best be dealt with by the Troika. Speaking before the French, German and British Foreign Ministers jointly secured a commitment from Teheran to suspend its uranium enrichment programme and allow unrestricted inspection of its nuclear facilities, participants stressed that America, Russia and the Europeans should join in using their influence on Iran to halt its nuclear weapons programs and to join in efforts to bring peace to the Middle East region. If the Three acted together, they would have far more leverage on Teheran.

Returning to the headline theme set for this session, one of the European participants spoke of concern over the growing gulf between the people of Europe and of the United States. One participant thought this reflects a clash of economic cultures. Another attributed it to a clash of strategic cultures. He argued that several factors accounted for this including history, geography, and multi-culturalism. Most wars have been fought on European soil and this inclines Europeans to be peacemakers, and to prefer diplomacy to military instruments. America on the other hand has only twice been attacked on its own soil and this has led Americans to feel far more relaxed over involving itself in military intervention. In practical terms, this leads to a conflict of strategic goals when forced to confront threat.

Differences between Europeans and Americans over pre-emptive strategy have become a neuralgic issue, it was argued. This meant that the less Europe is prepared to use the threat of intervention the more likely it is that the US will act unilaterally. Both sides must get their minds round the issue of deterrence and military intervention. It is also vital for the Troika countries to recognise the rule of law as paramount and to define their commitment to a common value system, including respect for human rights. Realpolitik should not be allowed to clash with fundamental principles and beliefs.

#### **Session IV Strategies for Trilateral Action**

The exchanges during this session confirmed considerable interest in developing the AMEURUS concept as a tool to identify issues that deserve to be handled on a trilateral basis and to promote cooperation between America, Europe and Russia. At a minimum AMEURUS can be a forum where the Troika countries can frankly discuss where they all stand on challenges like terrorism and the Middle East. But the speakers also recognised the difficulties of achieving such synergies. Even if AMEURUS as a private initiative works, can governments be engaged in the Troika process? Should AMEURUS lobby for support? Does the United States have the political will for such a dialogue? Is Russia prepared to accept a trilateral approach to the problems of Chechnya or of Siberia? Are the Europeans prepared to open their integration process to Troika scrutiny? The distance between issues that deserve to engage the AMEURUS process and public awareness of what is at stake are huge.

Rarely can any project have made so much sense and yet been so difficult to achieve, said one of the participants. The way the Troika countries have done business with each other in recent years suggests that they are determined to ignore what has worked for them and to re-invent points of conflict that divide them. America's unilateralist style, compounded by infighting within the US Administration, is one of the contributing factors. But so also is Europe's self-absorption and Russia's quiescence on the common agenda that Presidents Bush and Putin had drawn up after 9/11.

The Iraq war and its aftermath has shown that the fissures were far deeper than had been assumed, said an American participant. The international community, and in particular Europe and Russia have been reluctant to join with the United States in the reconstruction of Iraq. Yet any country that has a stake in stability in the Middle East should recognise that if America loses in Iraq, the consequences will affect them all. Conversely the world would be a safer place if Europe and Russia join to influence an American-led effort to change a region. Naturally that would require adjustments in Washington. But it also requires an honest dialogue between the Europeans and the US about the security, political and economic structures of the future and what Europe can contribute towards Middle East peace and stability. The first priority – one of the

recurring themes of the Kronberg meeting - is to arrive at a common threat assessment. That however will only be possible if France and other like-minded countries in Europe abandon their claim that the Iraq war and Al Qaeda terrorism are all part of a conflict between Muslims and Christians that can best be solved by political and religious concessions.

Russia for its part, the speaker continued, will only be able make a contribution to the wider debate if it can bring itself to see the crisis in Chechnya more realistically and stop portraying its problems as nothing more than Islamic terrorism projected from the outside to confuse a patriotic peace-loving people. The priority now is for the Troika to write itself a common defence and security agenda. NATO as an institution for the collective defence of its members against Soviet attack has become a wasting asset. If it is to have a future, this participant insisted, it will have to be in the sphere of peacekeeping and perhaps even of nation-building. New models, possibly a replacement institution and most of all a new commitment to common purpose must be devised.

Outlining an agenda for trilateral cooperation as a continuing process, the speaker put Iraq as the first priority followed by Iran and the rest of the Middle East. Next comes the need to minimise terrorism and to devise strategies for dealing with failed states. The Troika should also make it its goal to engage China to become a constructive force for peace and security. Wider issues of terrorism and failed states must also be tackled. Other participants had further items to put on the Troika's agenda: crisis management, governance, health issues, immigration, trade and investment with special attention to oil and energy issues as a driving force towards trilateralsim. One participant's dream went further: he wanted to see a revitalised NATO replace the US command in Iraq, and for US, EU and Russian envoys in Iraq to oversee the process towards democratisation. Another pleaded for new alliance instruments beyond the existing institutional framework; but also greater focus on functional cooperation and a determined lobby effort to convince the public and governments of the wisdom of trilateral initiatives.

Others, however, cautioned: do not be over ambitious. Dreams are rarely realised; a minimalist bottom-up approach, taking in lessons from practical experience of trilateral cooperation would be far wiser.

Russia remains largely inward-looking and preoccupied with its transformation into a modern free market nation, a Russian speaker emphasised. Even so from Russia's vantage point there is great interest in the trilateral approach, especially on security and matters of cultural alignment. AMEURUS, this Russian speaker argued, is the right vehicle for identifying the major contemporary themes calling for cooperative handling by America, Europe and Russia. Provided the right mechanism is found trilateralism could be far more effective than to address major issues on a bilateral basis. The UN Security Council was repeatedly quoted as one institution the Troika should utilise to define and implement common strategies. Unity among the five permanent members of the Security Council was crucial both for the Troika and also for pursuing a more inclusive policy towards China. It was important to engage China as a constructive force for peace and security. While several participants also saw the G8, with Russia a full member, as a useful instrument for the Troika approach, others argued that the G8 was a spent force.

Any agenda for the Troika should include the Middle East including Iraq and Iran. The Russian Federation with its large Muslim population has a vital concern in stability in the area. In Iraq, Russia firmly believes that the US must stay the course, deserves to be supported and cannot be allowed to fail. Russian speakers even suggested that security considerations in their country call for a trilateral strategy in bringing peace to Chechnya. Arguably Russia should also seek international understandings on how to handle potential crises in the Central Asian Republics as well as in Georgia where President Shevardnadze's hold on power was becoming increasingly tenuous.

One of the more controversial propositions put forward during this session was for the Troika to contemplate the 'recolonisation' of failed states. This should be seen not as a repetition of expansionist colonisation but as a defensive move designed as a temporary measure to create stability and implant democracy. A US participant countered that Washington would never go along with such a concept. Instead thought

should be given to revitalising the UN Trusteeship concept as a way of dealing with failed states. A Russian participant was even more adamant. Learning from Moscow's efforts to recolonise Chechnya, it was surely plain that the *mission civilisatrice* has had its day.

It is better to bring up controversial issues than dance around taboo issues, asserted another speaker. AMEURUS will be useful only if it fosters frankness. The AMEURUS forum must, for example, tackle the doctrine of pre-emptive intervention and ask whether such practise complies with existing international law. In this context, how sacred is the doctrine of sovereignty? Can a case be made, in law, for overriding respect for sovereignty when justified by the need to safeguard civilian populations? With the wisdom of hindsight it might have been more legally justified if intervention in Iraq had been advocated on humanitarian grounds rather than by claims of imminent threat by weapons of mass destruction. Another unresolved issue in international law is whether Al Qaeda can be treated in international law as a virtual state, where intervention under certain circumstances is legitimate.

Beyond legal concerns, this speaker also pointed a finger at Russia's slow progress towards democracy and stressed that a healthy civil society required a free press, respect for human rights and the rule of law and support for voluntary organisations. Perhaps AMEURUS should be recruited to assist Russia with its own nation-building.

In an outspoken summary of concerns that had been expressed during the Kronberg conference, it was argued by one participant that US leadership had to be improved if it was to earn European support. The US could not command blind support. It could not expect followers to follow if it did not supply credible leadership. As for the Europeans, they too have much to resolve. They have to decide between three options: whether to aim for partnership with the US, or to be content to act in a subsidiary role, or to try and go their own ways. As for Russia, the real test of its ability to play a responsible world role will be its policies and behaviour towards its own near-East. In sum, the problems confronting the Troika countries are less difficult than the changes of attitude required from each of the three components if they are to work in concert.

At this session a number of speakers argued that some sort of declaration of manifesto should be produced by the AMEURUS project, possibly taking up the model of previous 'Wise Men's' reports: such a text could be presented to governments, to the G8, the Russia/NATO Council and so on. In a similar spirit, speakers talked about the need to find some way of bringing out what agreement was there on those issues that could be fruitfully addressed in the trilateral format: these included values, security, energy, Iran and world governance. It would require real seriousness of purpose to pursue this dialogue – and openness.

### **Closing Remarks**

Lord Weidenfeld, the initiator of the AMEURUS project said that this meeting together with the three AMEURUS conferences held earlier this year had demonstrated the usefulness of the process. Participants had spoken freely, had learned from each other and had been able to pinpoint the most urgent issues for discussion and cooperation. For future discussions it was important to focus not only on the big geo-political questions but also on the media, the arts, human rights and governance – all subjects for AMEURUS meetings already in the planning stage for 2004.

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