Strategic thinking for a resilient and competitive Europe

The UK’s SDR and its implications for ‘the Three’

The Strategic Defence Review provides clear and unambiguous support for closer cooperation between Britain, France and Germany, writes Peter Watkins.

The much anticipated publication of the UK Government’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR) on Monday 2 June prompted an avalanche of commentaries from defence pundits, trade associations, think-tanks, etc. Having let the general tumult subside, this blog focuses on the implications of the SDR for “we Three”.

In a break from past practice, the SDR was “externally led” by three senior Reviewers from outside government – the head reviewer, Lord George Robertson, spoke at our Fireside Chat in March. However, it cannot be described as an “independent” review – there was close interaction with the Government, and the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) in particular, throughout.

The original commission from the new Government in July 2024 set certain policy parameters – one of which was the commitment to a “NATO First” defence policy. The Review argues that the UK faces a “… new era of threat and challenge” and that “… the UK’s longstanding assumptions about global power balances and structures are no longer certain.” That exercise in British understatement must surely apply to France and Germany too!

Asserting bluntly that UK Defence is “… not currently optimised for warfare against a ‘peer’ military state”, the Review advocates some “fundamental changes” – notably turning the UK’s armed forces into an “Integrated Force”; a “new partnership with industry”, recognising (somewhat belatedly in my view) that “innovation and industrial power are central to deterrence”; and a “whole-of-society” approach to building wider national resilience. Some of the specific changes proposed by the Review are not new – but they are packaged together in a more coherent way than previous recent strategic documents.

Finally consigning Boris Johnson’s “tilt to the Indo-Pacific” to the dustbin of history, the Review is clear that the focus of the UK’s effort should be the homeland and the neighbourhood, namely the Euro-Atlantic area – any military deployments elsewhere should not detract from that mission. And “[w]ith the US clear that the security of Europe is no longer its primary international focus, the UK and European allies must step up their efforts.” The Review sees “Alliances and partnerships [as] the bedrock of global stability” and argues that the UK should be “actively investing” in them using the “full range of levers available” – including through cooperation on capabilities and between defence industries as well as by “minilateral action with Allies”, especially the E3 and the Joint Expeditionary Force (which includes the UK and Nordic/Baltic allies).

Specifically with respect to France and Germany, the Review says that the UK MOD “should build upon the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties with France and the landmark Trinity House Agreement with Germany as the basis for increasingly close cooperation: developing [a] shared outlook, cutting-edge capabilities, burden-sharing arrangements, and industrial capacity and growth.”

It adds that the MOD should support implementation of the new UK-EU Security and Defence Partnership, noting that the “EU is a defence and security actor of increasing significance, whose unique regulatory and financial levers can complement NATO’s role as the primary guarantor of European security.”

While the last-quoted sentence represents a significant shift in sentiment in London – which will hopefully be welcomed in Paris and Berlin – not all of this is new. But the Review provides clear and unambiguous support for closer and more structured defence and security cooperation between “we Three” on the basis of pragmatism and mutual benefit.

The challenge now will be to turn the fine words into real projects which boost Europe’s collective defence (and defence industrial) capability. While that task will fall mainly to governments, there is a key role for organisations such as ours – that bring together key stakeholders in the public sphere, industry, academia and civil society – to build understanding, identify opportunities and help find solutions.

June 2025

Peter Watkins is Club of Three Senior Adviser – Defence and International Security. He is also an Associate Fellow at Chatham House and Visiting Senior Fellow at LSE IDEAS. Peter was Director General for Security Policy, Strategy and International, at the UK Ministry of Defence between 2014 and 2018.